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In an important 1997 article, Elaine Sorensen estimated that an additional $34 billion in child support could be collected from nonresident fathers. The article and other research contributed to the development of a more stringent child support system. Currently, a key goal of child support enforcement activities is increasing the amount paid by fathers of children receiving welfare in an effort to recoup a portion of government expenditures for public assistance. But even if nonresident fathers in general might pay more, this does not mean that fathers of children receiving welfare could do so. This article provides information on the economic circumstances of fathers of children receiving welfare.
Changes in child support policy have come simultaneously with rad-ical changes in the way the nation provides income support to lowincome families. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA; U.S. Public Law 104-193) of 1996 eliminated the main program that provided cash assistance to single-parent families for over 60 years, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), replacing it with Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). The TANF program allows states to design their own programs, has a focus on work, and establishes a lifetime limit on cash assistance. Because many TANF recipients have limited human capital, their earnings may always be below the poverty level. In light of time-limited cash assistance and frequently low earnings, other sources of income become more critical to the long-term economic well-being of TANF-eligible women and their children. 1 The legislation that created TANF recognized this and also includes substantial changes to the child support system. The changes are designed to increase the amount of support paid by nonresident fathers. Part of the motivation for the child support reform is a hope that some single mothers can rely on a combination of support from the nonresident fathers and their own earnings, rather than cash assistance. Another motivation is a sense that some nonresident fathers do not provide what they could for their children, leaving taxpayers to foot the bill.
Although the political rhetoric suggests that fathers could be providing substantially more income for their children (see, e.g., New York Times 1996a , 1996b , several factors lead to skepticism. First, individuals tend to partner with others who have similar characteristics (Mare 1991) . Just as the mothers receiving TANF generally have low levels of education (USDHHS, ACF 2002) , many of the fathers of their children can be expected to have similarly low levels, limiting their earning potential. Second, as many families have left TANF programs, one might expect those who remain to be the least able to achieve economic self-sufficiency. If the fathers of their children have similar characteristics, they may be least able to provide economic support. Finally, the most recent round of child support reforms comes after 2 decades of child support changes. It may be that most of the gains in child support have already been achieved.
A variety of studies of nonresident fathers have appeared over the years, but most focus on the general population, not on the fathers of children receiving welfare. Moreover, very few studies have been conducted since the radical changes in welfare policy. Using a unique data source based on TANF recipients in Wisconsin, this article begins to bridge these gaps.
Policy Context
One of the changes in child support policy over the last decade is an increasing attempt to formally establish legal paternity for children born outside of marriage. Formal establishment of paternity generally leads to a legally enforceable child support order. Policy changes encourage voluntary paternity acknowledgment at the time a child is born and increase the availability of genetic testing to determine fatherhood. Other changes in the last 2 decades include using a numerical formula to determine the amount owed and automatically withholding child support from the earnings of the nonresident parent. Wisconsin has historically been a leader in child support policy (Meyer et al. 1996) and continues to have very high cost-effectiveness rates compared to other states (USDHHS, ACF 2003) .
Wisconsin is a leader in instituting some aspects of welfare reform. It began its TANF program, Wisconsin Works, or W-2, in September 1997. Wisconsin's program is among the most work-focused (Pavetti 2001) , requiring immediate work (or a worklike activity) of all recipients except those who have children less than 13 weeks old. One of the key innovative features of W-2 is its treatment of child support. Most TANF recipients in the state receive all child support paid on their behalf; in other states, the state and federal governments keep most (or all) support paid and use it to offset welfare costs. The data used here were collected as part of an evaluation of the child support component of W-2.
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Because of changes in both child support and welfare policy, the characteristics of fathers of welfare recipients may also be changing. For example, tougher laws regarding paternity establishment may mean that there are more legal fathers of welfare recipients than previously. In addition, the welfare policy changes of 1996, combined with unprecedented economic expansion, led to the lowest welfare caseloads in years. 3 Because of these caseload declines, current welfare recipients (and the fathers of their children) may represent a different population than the welfare recipients (and the fathers of their children) of a decade ago (see Moffitt and Stevens 2001; Zedlewski and Alderson 2001) .
Previous Literature
A number of previous researchers explore the characteristics of nonresident fathers of children, focusing on their ability to pay support. For example, Irwin Garfinkel, Sara McLanahan, and Thomas Hanson (1998) summarize previous income estimates, showing that the range of mean incomes for all nonresident fathers, not just those whose children receive welfare, falls approximately between $29,000 and $32,400 (in 1999 dollars). 4 They also provide a new estimate that is within this range. Sorensen (1997) reports average personal income of nonresident fathers to be somewhat lower, at about $24,500, with poverty rates of 15-25 percent among this group. Daniel Meyer (1998) also estimates median personal income of fathers at about $24,500, and provides additional information showing substantial variation in fathers' incomes; one-quarter of fathers have incomes below $7,300, and one-quarter have incomes above $41,000. A recent estimate, based on the 1997 National Survey of America's Families, is that 26 percent of nonresident fathers are poor (Sorensen and Zibman 2001) .
Research on low-income fathers also provides information on the characteristics of fathers of children on welfare. For example, Elaine Sorensen and Chava Zibman (2001) explicitly compare the characteristics of low-income resident mothers and low-income nonresident fathers. But this research does not directly assess the range of capacities of fathers of children receiving welfare. For example, it is possible that many of the fathers associated with children receiving welfare do not have low incomes. Indeed, some current policies assume that these fathers could pay more.
One of the earliest estimates for fathers of children receiving welfare (Oellerich 1984) projects mean personal income of the fathers of Wisconsin AFDC recipients to be about $16,000, compared with the same study's estimates for all divorced fathers of about $37,500 and for all separated fathers of about $28,000. Other dated estimates of the mean or median personal income of the fathers of AFDC recipients in North Carolina (Haskins et al. 1985) and Ohio and Florida (Sonenstein and Calhoun 1990) are also in the $11,000-$16,000 range. The most recent study (USDHHS, OIG 2002) , examining tax records of 270 nonresident parents of children receiving TANF in 1996 in 10 states, reports that mean earnings increased from about $9,000 in 1995 to $11,000 in 1999. Although average incomes are quite low, about one-fifth of the nonresident parents have earnings over $15,000.
Related research includes a recent survey with information on fathers of "fragile families" in seven large cities across the United States (Rich 2001) . The sample includes fathers of children receiving welfare, as well as other fathers. Average incomes are estimated to be about $17,000 for the unmarried fathers; 40 percent of them earn less than $9,000. Anu Rangarajan and Philip Gleason (1998) examine fathers connected with teen mothers receiving welfare in three cities; although they provide no income information, they do report that only about two-thirds of the fathers had completed high school, so their overall ability to pay may be low.
Related research examines whether paying child support is impoverishing fathers (see, e.g., Nichols-Casebolt 1986; Sorensen 1997; Meyer 1998; Bartfeld 2000) . This literature finds that few fathers fall below the poverty line because of the amount of support they are ordered to pay or the amount they actually pay. Nonetheless, contributing fathers with low incomes pay a higher proportion of their income in child support than do fathers with moderate or high incomes (Meyer 1998; Sorensen and Oliver 2002) . It is not known whether the nonresident fathers of welfare recipients can afford to pay more support.
An emerging body of qualitative literature examines the lives of lowincome nonresident fathers, many of them urban African-American men whose children receive welfare (Johnson, Levine, and Doolittle 1999; Waller and Plotnick 2001; Pate 2002) . This literature documents some of the barriers to paying child support. Such barriers might include limited connection to the formal labor force, low and fluctuating earnings that make it difficult to comply with support orders, support orders that do not reflect current earnings, and the accumulation of arrearages that many fathers have little hope of paying. This qualitative investigation presents important findings and highlights the need for additional research to determine how common these problems are for a broader population.
The success of attempts to understand the broader population of fathers of welfare recipients is limited by the difficulty of collecting adequate data on the nonresident fathers of children receiving welfare. One approach is to survey mothers, collecting information on their welfare use and asking them questions about the characteristics of the fathers of their children. This approach is taken in the first national survey of child support, the Current Population Survey-Child Support Supplement of 1980. However, because relatively few mothers responded with current information about the father, these questions were dropped in subsequent years. Moreover, even if more mothers had responded, those who did would include only mothers who had stayed in touch with the father or had other sources of information on the fathers' current situation. The information would not have been representative of all fathers of children receiving welfare.
A second approach is to examine mothers receiving welfare and from their characteristics to attempt to make estimates about the fathers (see, e.g., Oellerich 1984; Miller, Garfinkel, and McLanahan 1997) . These estimates rely on the accuracy of the estimation method and the assumptions about the relationship between the characteristics of mothers and the characteristics of the fathers. A third approach is to use the administrative records of the child support office, perhaps combined with administrative records on earnings and welfare use (see, e.g., Haskins et al. 1985) . A limitation of this work is that a substantial number of fathers do not have administrative records of earnings, perhaps because they are not working at all (including those in prison), are working out of state, or have other sources of income (e.g., working in the informal economy or self-employed). Finally, some examine the characteristics of men who claim to be fathers. This approach is limited because the number of men claiming to have fathered a child is much smaller than the number of women who have had children. In addition, the standard surveys tend to underrepresent low-income men, primarily men of color, especially if they are only loosely attached to more than one household. Although a variety of strategies are used to address these problems, including reweighting the data (Sorensen 1997; Garfinkel, McLanahan, and Hanson 1998; Sorensen and Zibman 2001) , uncertainty persists regarding the accuracy of the results. Another limitation of this approach is that many men do not know if the mother of their children is receiving welfare, again making it difficult to identify the appropriate sample. Finally, attempts to interview nonresident fathers are beset with numerous problems. Very low response rates are a particular concern (see, e.g., Hofferth et al. 1997 ).
Data, Sample, and Methods
An ideal data set for examining the economic status of the fathers of children receiving welfare would have information on matched pairs of fathers and mothers. Fathers' reports could be used to measure their characteristics, and mothers' reports could be used as the source of information on welfare participation. Moreover, the ideal data set would combine survey and administrative data, since welfare use is often not reported accurately in surveys (e.g., see Meyer and Sullivan 2001) , while administrative data generally only contain records of individual formal earnings (not family income) and do not include information on family composition. Ideal data would of course be representative of the population studied. Finally, access to recent data is particularly important, given that both the child support and welfare systems have undergone substantial reform in the last several years.
Although no known single data source is ideal, the results reported here are based on information from matched pairs of fathers and mothers, administrative data on welfare payments, survey data on family income and household composition, quite recent data, and data that are generally representative of the legal fathers of children receiving TANF. Several sources of data are combined, drawing on the best available source for each question.
Administrative Records
Three sources of Wisconsin administrative records are merged, thereby providing information on program participation, formal earnings of mothers and fathers, the demographic characteristics of the mother and children, and, to a more limited extent, the demographic characteristics of the fathers. 5 These merged administrative data also provide information on child support orders and payments, as well as on paternity. This allows an examination of whether each of the children living with the mother has a legal father (i.e., whether each child was a marital child, in which case legal paternity is presumed, or a nonmarital child, for whom paternity has been formally established).
The analysis of administrative records begins with all mothers who entered W-2 during the initial months from September 1, 1997 , to July 9, 1998 , and who were demographically eligible for child support (i.e., there was a living nonresident father). The final sample includes 15,977 mothers, about three-quarters of those who entered W-2 over this period. The remaining one-quarter of mothers who entered W-2 but were not part of CSDE includes mothers who were mistakenly not given a research code and those not eligible for child support (the child's father died or both parents were living with the child). An analysis of these cases shows little difference in most characteristics between the CSDE sample and those who entered W-2 during this period (Cancian, Caspar, and Meyer 2001) . Matched administrative data on child support suggest that about 30 percent of these mothers only have nonmarital children for whom paternity was not established, so no legal fathers can be sampled.
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Some mothers have had children with more than one legal father, and some men have children with more than one W-2 mother. Counting each father only once, there are 13,339 nonresident fathers in the final sample.
7 For this sample of legal fathers of children in families receiving W-2, administrative records from the welfare and child support systems are merged to identify any additional legal children of the father among all the children whose mother received W-2 at any point between September 1997 and June 2002.
Survey Data
Mothers and fathers are surveyed in the Survey of Wisconsin Works Families (Krecker 2001) . About 3,000 mothers were sampled in spring 1999 (covering information in calendar year 1998) and again in spring 2000 (covering calendar year 1999). Completion rates for mothers were 82 percent during each period. One focal child of each mother was selected in this survey, and the relevant legal father also was sampled. In many cases, it was particularly difficult to locate fathers. Because location was so difficult, about one-third of the fathers were randomly selected to be eligible for in-person as well as telephone interviews. Completion rates were 33 percent during each period for the full sample. Among fathers in the subsample eligible for in-person interviews, completion rates were 43 percent at time 1 and 46 percent at time 2. While completion rates for fathers are low relative to mothers, they are high when compared with those achieved in comparable surveys (Hofferth et al. 1997) . Moreover, because of the extensive administrative data on all the fathers in the original survey sample (those interviewed and those not), it is possible to construct weights to account for differ-ential nonresponse (see Ziliak and Krecker 2001) . There is survey information on 572 fathers at time 1 and 603 at time 2.
The survey contains demographic information on fathers, including education, health, family background, their own earnings, other income, their spouse's or partner's earnings and other income, and the composition of their households. Data from administrative sources, as well as from the surveys of mothers and fathers, are used to describe the characteristics and situation of nonresident fathers of children whose mothers receive TANF benefits. A key objective is to describe the economic situation of nonresident fathers of children receiving welfare. In addition to descriptive statistics, a simple simulation compares amounts that fathers are paying with the amounts they could be paying according to the child support rules. Table 1 shows characteristics of the legal fathers of children whose families receive W-2, with information taken from the administrative records at the time the family entered W-2. The data show that nearly half of these men are younger than age 30 and about one in five are younger than 25. Although the men are relatively young, they are older on average than the mothers of W-2 children, of whom 64 percent are younger than 30. The race of a substantial number of fathers is unknown, but more than three-quarters of the men with known race are men of color, primarily African Americans. Both the relatively young ages and the high proportion of men of color suggest that income of these men would be lower than for the general population of nonresident fathers.
Findings

Characteristics of Nonresident Fathers
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The next two panels show the range in the number of children for whom a father is legally responsible. They include all children for whom legal paternity has been established, whether or not there is a child support order. About half the fathers had one, about one-quarter had two, and about one-quarter had three or more nonresident children whose mother received welfare between September 1997 and June 2002. Considering all the nonresident children for whom a father is legally responsible (those in families receiving and not receiving welfare), the next panel shows that over 45 percent of fathers are responsible for three or more children. Comparing these panels, a substantial proportion of fathers could have obligations to support children in at least two families, one that received welfare during this period and one that did not. The number of children for which fathers feel responsible may be even greater, as some fathers live with new biological children. Ethnographic research has shown that some fathers also consider their responsibilities to extend to children of a new partner (e.g., Pate 2002). Source.-Administrative data for the Wisconsin child support system (KIDS) and the public assistance systems (CARES).
Note.-AFDC p Aid to Families with Dependent Children. * Missing information on 605 fathers. † Where fathers were associated with more than one mother, the characteristics of a randomly selected mother are shown in these panels.
Moreover, some fathers have had additional children for whom paternity has not yet been legally established. The current figures suggest that two-thirds of the fathers in the sample face obligations to support multiple children.
The remaining panels show characteristics of a randomly selected mother of each father's children. All the mothers were welfare participants at the time they entered the sample. The first panel shows that the majority of men were partnered with long-term AFDC recipients. The next panel shows that many of these men were partnered with women who have complicated families; in two-fifths of the families, there is at least one child from a different father, in addition to the child(ren) of this father. In another one-quarter of these families, there are children for whom paternity has not yet been established and who may be fathered by another man. For the reasons noted above, it is very difficult to collect systematic information on complicated family structures from the perspective of fathers. While the administrative data are limited, they provide a conservative estimate of the complexity of family structure for a large representative sample of nonresident fathers of children on welfare. Table 2 provides a richer set of descriptive information on the 572 men who responded to the first wave of the Survey of Wisconsin Works Families. The table shows that only about one-sixth of the fathers live alone. More than half live in a household with at least some children, and about one-third live with at least one of their own biological children. These figures suggest that the child support system may have a difficult time collecting support for children living outside the home if fathers believe their first responsibility is to children living with them.
This table also reveals substantial barriers to employment and earnings. About one-third of those in the sample had less than a high school diploma, and only one in five had education beyond high school. About three-fifths of the fathers reported either excellent or very good health, but 17 percent reported either fair or poor health, and about one-fifth stated that they had a health problem preventing work.
The next three panels show information about these fathers' families of origin. Few had parents with more than a high school diploma, although the proportion of those who did not know the level of mother's or father's education is substantial, about one-third. More than half did not live with both parents through age 16.
The final panels provide information on housing, transportation, and use of financial institutions. Home ownership is relatively uncommon. A substantial proportion of fathers share housing: over one-quarter live with relatives, and another 7 percent live with friends. Only about onequarter of fathers report that the safety of their neighborhood is "excellent," with 11 percent reporting that it is "fair" or "bad." About half of fathers report owning a car (about a third of those who did not own Overall, the information in tables 1 and 2 suggests that many of the fathers of children whose families are in W-2 have relatively low levels of human capital and few economic resources with which to support their children. Moreover, a majority are living with other children, so these men may divide those limited resources among multiple families. Compared with previous research providing characteristics of all nonresident fathers (Sorensen 1997; Garfinkel et al. 1998) , the data reported here on a Wisconsin sample suggest that fathers of children receiving welfare are younger, more likely to be African American, and are less likely to graduate from high school. Moreover, fewer of the fathers of welfare recipients own a home (15 percent, compared with 39 percent for the national sample of Garfinkel and associates) or a car (47 percent, compared with 80 percent in the national sample of Garfinkel and associates). Given these characteristics, one would predict that the fathers of children receiving welfare would have substantially lower earnings and income than all nonresident fathers.
Fathers' Economic Status
As reported in administrative data, fathers' formal earnings are quite low, averaging $7,312 in 1998 and $7,707 in 1999. 10 These means are below the poverty thresholds for a single-adult family: $8,480 in 1998 and $8,667 in 1999. Figure 1 shows the distribution of fathers' earnings and documents the substantial proportion of fathers with very low formal Fig. 1. -Earnings of fathers. Source: Unemployment Insurance (UI) records. The sample of all fathers includes 13,339 cases. Of these, 607 cases were excluded here because the Social Security number was missing and there was no match with UI records. Thus, 12,732 cases were used in the figure. earnings.
11 In 1998, 38 percent of fathers had no earnings recorded in the administrative records, and another 33 percent had reported earnings of less than $10,000. Only about 5 percent had earnings above $30,000. There was little improvement among these categories between 1998 and 1999. Although the share of fathers with no earnings was quite similar between 1998 and 1999, among those fathers with earnings, average earnings increased, from a mean of $11,800 to $13,000, and from a median of $8,600 to $9,800.
The earnings measures come from employer reports to the Unemployment Insurance system and as such include only formal earnings for covered workers. About 93 percent of workers in Wisconsin are covered under this system. Survey information on a random sample of mothers and fathers includes income reports, with some mothers asked questions about the income of the father of one of their children. There are survey reports in 1998 for 105 fathers who had no earnings in the administrative record in that year, and survey reports in 1999 for 157 fathers who had no earnings in the administrative record in that year. In both years, about half of those with zero earnings in the administrative record report zero earnings in the survey; those who did report earnings reported median amounts of $8,000 in 1998 and $12,000 in 1999. Of those who report zero earnings in the survey, about half report other personal income, with median amounts of $1,500 in 1998 and $6,000 in 1999. Thus, although the administrative record may miss informal earnings and self-employment, a substantial proportion of fathers may not have income from these sources. In sum, a substantial proportion of fathers must have very low personal income.
Earnings are not the only source of income for the fathers of children receiving welfare.
12 Figure 2 shows that according to the survey data, a father's own earnings are about 70 percent of the family income package in both years. In 1998, 78 percent of fathers reported earnings, with an average among these fathers of $14,600, and an overall average (including those without earnings) of $11,400. These amounts are higher than the averages in the administrative record: the 62 percent of fathers with earnings in the administrative record have average earnings of $11,800, with an overall average of only $7,300. This difference may reflect fathers who are self-employed or who work in informal jobs. About 30 percent of fathers report other income, which may include unemployment compensation, Social Security Disability, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and various other forms. Among fathers who report unearned income, it averages about $2,600; over all fathers, it averages about $800. Thus, calculated average personal income for these fathers is about $12,200. This is within the range of the estimates from the previous literature summarized by Garfinkel and his associates (1998) . Only a minority of fathers live with partners. However, 30 percent of the sample have partners with earnings, averaging over $12,000, Of these, 112 cases refused to answer or responded that they did not know. The sample includes 603 cases for 1999. Of these, 99 cases refused to answer or responded that they did not know.
for an average in the entire sample of fathers of nearly $4,000. Other income from a partner increases average family income of nonresident fathers by about $600, raising total average family income for nonresident fathers in 1998 to $16,620.
Between 1998 and 1999, both the share of fathers with earnings and the share of fathers with other income increased, as did the average amounts, bringing a father's personal income total to $15,200. Partner income was quite similar to 1999, bringing total average family income for nonresident fathers to $19,566. Half of fathers had family incomes of $10,000 or lower in 1998, and nearly one-third had family income of $5,000 or less. In contrast, 9 percent of fathers had family incomes over $40,000. The increase in income between 1998 and 1999 seen in figure 2 is due in large part to fewer fathers having very low incomes; the percentage with incomes of $10,000 or less declined from 50 percent in 1998 to 33 percent in 1999.
In 1998, the poverty rate for fathers before paying support was a quite high 43 percent. 13 The 1999 rate is still a quite high 34 percent. Nevertheless, most fathers of children receiving welfare are not officially poor, and a small but significant proportion have earnings above $20,000.
In summary, while data limitations reduce the precision of estimates, several conclusions are supported. Consistent with these personal characteristics, fathers have very low formal earnings in administrative records. Apparent family income is somewhat higher and grows over this 2-year period, but poverty levels based on family income are still very high. However, there is substantial diversity in outcomes, both across the sample of fathers, and for individual fathers over the 2 years.
Child Support and Poverty
Recent research highlights problems with the way the child support system treats low-income fathers (Mincy and Sorensen 1998; USDHHS, OIG 2000; Sorensen and Zibman 2001; Waller and Plotnick 2001; Pate 2002) . One problem is setting orders based on imputed income, which may be substantially more than actual income.
14 Other problems include requiring fathers to pay the costs associated with a child's birth and imposing support amounts that are designed to compensate retroactively for costs accumulated since the child's nonmarital birth or the couple's separation.
The Wisconsin guideline requires a child support order of 17 percent of a fathers' income if he has one nonresident child, rising to 25, 29, 31, and 34 percent, respectively, for two to five children. The median percentage of earnings owed in child support is estimated to be 29 percent using the administrative data. In contrast, the survey estimates suggest 17 percent as the median percentage of income owed in child support. 15 One of the main reasons the estimated percentage owed in the survey is lower is that the survey contains more sources of income. Considering the survey, about one in four fathers were ordered to pay more than 40 percent of their reported personal income in child support. In some cases, high relative orders result from fathers being ordered to contribute to multiple families. In other cases, orders may be high because they were set based on imputed income (rather than actual income), or because orders did not change when fathers' income decreased.
Fathers also owe considerable amounts to the state. Upon entering AFDC, mothers were required to surrender to the state their rights to all past-due child support. Moreover, any amounts owed during a period of benefit receipt were owed to the state, and the state tried to collect these amounts. Many fathers owe not only these amounts associated with child support but also reimbursement to the state to cover the costs of a Medicaid-funded birth. These debts accrue interest. Fathers owed considerable amounts to the state when their children entered W-2. The median amount due among fathers in the administrative sample was $2,829, and about one in six fathers owed at least $10,000. Given the relatively low incomes of these men, it is not surprising to find in other studies that many fathers believe they will never be able to fully repay such high arrears (Pate 2002) . Figure 3 examines the proportion of fathers paying support by category of fathers' personal income. This figure generally shows the expected relationship between income and likelihood of paying: those with the least income are least likely to pay. However, the greater likelihood that higher-income fathers will pay seems to hold true only for those with incomes below $30,000. Those in the highest income category (over $30,000) are somewhat less likely to pay than those with incomes between $20,000 and $30,000. 16 The administrative record shows that between 32 and 57 percent of those who reported no personal income in the survey paid support. This finding is perhaps due to reporting errors concerning income. It may also be that participants were drawing down assets, using credit, or relying on the incomes of others. Figure 4 shows the average amount paid among those who made a child support payment. Similar to figure 3, it suggests a positive relationship between income and support paid. On average, however, lowerincome fathers who pay support remit a higher proportion of their income. For example, among payers in 1999, the median proportion of personal income paid as support is 19 percent for fathers with incomes below $10,000, and 10 percent for fathers with incomes above $20,000. Even among the highest-income group, child support payments average less than $3,800, an amount substantially less than the $8,000 of potential cash benefits received by families in W-2 for an entire year.
One important issue is whether paying child support leads to the The sample includes 572 cases for 1998. Of these, 49 did not provide income information, and 141 did not pay child support. Sample sizes within income categories for 1998 are as follows: 23 cases with zero income, 112 cases with incomes $1-$10,000; 114 cases with incomes $10,001-$20,000; 71 cases with incomes $20,001-$30,000; 62 cases with incomes over $30,000. The sample includes 603 cases for 1999. Of these, 59 cases did not provide income information and 135 did not pay child support. Sample sizes within income categories for 1999 are as follows: 17 cases with zero income, 106 cases with incomes $1-$10,000; 126 cases with incomes $10,001-$20,000; 102 cases with incomes $20,001-$30,000; 58 cases with incomes over $30,000. impoverishment of low-income nonresident fathers. Recall that the poverty rate for fathers before paying support in 1998 was 43 percent and in 1999 was 34 percent. Only a few fathers fell below the poverty line if child support was subtracted, as the poverty rate increased from 43 to 45 percent in 1998 and from 34 to 37 percent in 1999. Although only a small number of fathers fell below a particular line due to child support payments, this figure does not reflect the impact of child support payments made by fathers who were already poor and who became more impoverished as a result of paying support. Among those poor in 1998 before paying child support, the average gap between their income and the poverty line was $6,902. After paying support, the average gap was $7,362. Fewer fathers were poor before paying child support in 1999, but the gap was still large, averaging $5,708 before paying and $6,379 after paying. Figure 5 shows the percentages of fathers reporting various types of hardships. In 1998, 11 percent of fathers said they often or sometimes did not have enough to eat. Sixteen percent reported that their gas or electricity was turned off, and 17 percent moved in with others because they could not pay the rent. Relatively few of the fathers lived in a shelter or on the street, but this type of hardship may be particularly underrepresented in our data (given the difficulty of locating and interviewing homeless fathers). About one-third of the fathers spent some time without a telephone. Most measures of hardship fell somewhat from 1998 to 1999; 47 percent of fathers reported at least one hardship in 1998, compared with 44 percent in 1999. Some fathers received help from private charities, churches, and community groups, including cash and vouchers to pay for rent, utilities, and telephone bills (about 4 percent), clothing and vouchers for clothing (2-6 percent), and food supplies or hot meals (10-14 percent). Thus, even though the figures reported for hardship are fairly high, only 13-15 percent of fathers report receiving any help from charities, churches, and community groups.
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Potential for Child Support from Fathers of Children in Families Receiving Welfare
Based on questions to fathers in the survey concerning the number of biological or adopted children not living with them, it is possible to estimate the amount of child support that these fathers would be ordered to pay if the Wisconsin standard were applied to their reported personal income. 18 As noted earlier, the Wisconsin standard requires 17 percent of gross income for one child, 25 percent for two, 29 percent for three, 31 percent for four, and 34 percent for five or more children. The estimated order reflects a simplification in that the court has the discretion not to apply the standard if the father has very low income. Moreover, if the father had children with more than one woman, the total child support required by the standard would be higher. If any child lived with him for at least 30 percent of the time, the amount required would be lower.
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If this estimated order were actually paid by fathers of children in families receiving W-2, it would obviously affect their income and poverty status. Evidence from the survey of fathers suggests that in 1998, the median personal income of nonresident fathers was $8,000 before paying child support and $7,560 after paying support. If all fathers paid the potential child support amount, median income would decline to $6,640. Thus, the gap between actual support and potential support is about $900 at the median. Comparable figures for 1999 are median personal income of $12,000 before paying support, $10,402 after paying support, and $9,750 if the father paid potential support, for a gap of about $650.
Poverty rates for fathers would also be affected by the payment of potential child support. As noted above, poverty rates for fathers in 1998 were 43 percent before paying and 45 percent after paying support. If fathers paid potential support, the poverty rate would rise further, to 48 percent. Comparable figures for 1999 are 34 percent, 37 percent, and 39 percent. If the Wisconsin standards are reasonable expectations and if the estimate of potential support is accurate, these figures imply that more could be paid without a substantial increase in poverty among nonresident fathers. However, the additional amount, while undoubtedly important to their children, would not bring many resident-mother families above the poverty line.
Implications
Recent welfare reforms aim to move poor families with children from welfare to self-sufficiency. Recognizing that many single mothers on welfare will face major obstacles in supporting their children on their own, the PRWORA legislation included measures aimed at increasing child support payments by nonresident fathers. This article does not focus on the many ways fathers contribute to their children outside the child support system; a review of these contributions that draws upon related survey data can be found in Seltzer and Schaeffer (2001) . Information from ethnographic data can be found in Pate (2002) or Waller and Plotnick (2001) . Here, administrative and survey data are used to assess the situation and potential financial contributions of nonresident fathers whose children have mothers participating in Wisconsin's TANF program.
The results confirm that most of these fathers have more limited economic resources than estimates suggested by research on all nonresident fathers: estimates of family income (averaging $16,000-$20,000) are lower than those based on all nonresident fathers ($24,500 in Sor-ensen [1997] and Meyer [1998] ). Similarly, over a third of these fathers have incomes below the poverty line, compared with the most recent estimate that 26 percent of all nonresident fathers are poor (Sorensen and Zibman 2001) . At the same time, some nonresident fathers of children receiving welfare have more substantial incomes. These fathers are not accounted for in research that focuses only on low-income fathers.
Estimates of fathers' resources are broadly similar to estimates based on the AFDC caseload. This finding is consistent with research showing that despite the declines in the caseload, TANF recipients are not necessarily more disadvantaged than AFDC recipients (e.g., Moffitt and Stevens 2001) .
Ethnographic researchers describe the difficult economic circumstances of nonresident fathers of children whose mothers receive welfare (Waller and Plotnick 2001; Pate 2002) . In general, the results presented here suggest that these difficult circumstances are fairly widespread: most fathers have low income, though there is substantial diversity among fathers and over time for individuals. Research from other states would be useful in more fully assessing the extent to which the ethnographic research can be generalized. Further research could also attempt to address some of the limitations of these data, for example, exploring reasons for the lack of administrative data on earnings for a substantial number of fathers. Additional efforts to collect high-quality survey data on nonresident fathers are also needed.
Given the challenges they face, should low-income nonresident fathers be expected to contribute to the support of their children? With the limited potential for substantially increasing payments, is increased child support enforcement a reasonable strategy? In answering these questions, it is important to recognize the radical change in context that grows from the limits on cash assistance mandated by PRWORA. In the absence of an entitlement to cash assistance for poor mothers and children, increasing support paid by nonresident fathers may be essential, even if these fathers are poor themselves. Although the poverty rates for fathers are quite high before payment of child support and are made somewhat higher by those payments (45 percent in 1998 and 37 percent in 1999), the poverty rates among mothers are substantially higher than those of fathers, even after child support is received. Among all mothers participating in W-2, the overall poverty rate after receiving child support was 76 percent in 1998 and 68 percent in 1999; for mothers of children who entered W-2 with legally established paternity (those most immediately eligible for support) poverty rates were 66 percent in 1998 and 63 percent in 1999. Similarly, while 44 percent of fathers reported at least one hardship in 1999, a substantial proportion, this figure is lower than the 57 percent of mothers of children with legally established paternity who reported a hardship in the same year.
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Additional initiatives aimed at increasing the earnings of nonresident fathers should also be considered. Effective programs have the potential to increase earnings and payments. Only by increasing nonresident fathers' earning capacity can child support serve to substantially decrease the poverty of resident mothers and their children without increasing it among nonresident fathers.
The difficult economic situation of resident mothers may make child support a continued focus, but it is important to recognize its limitations. Overall, even when the Wisconsin standard was applied in setting orders, and even when all orders were paid in full, the median father would pay only about $50-$75 per month more in child support. Although this support could be an important contribution to self-sufficiency, it is not adequate to help many families seeking to escape poverty though the earnings of a low-wage single mother. Continued public support is likely to be essential if the incomes available to these children and their parents are to rise above the poverty level.
Also lacking is information on the earnings of any workers employed outside of Wisconsin. UI records do not provide information on occupations, hourly wages, or hours worked.
6. In a voluntary system, mothers may assess the earning potential of a father to determine if it is worthwhile to pursue formal paternity establishment and child support. If this occurred, then the fathers of children for whom paternity has not been legally established would have lower earnings potential than the fathers of children in our sample. Even in a mandatory system in which all mothers cooperated, fathers would be most likely to be found if they had stable employment and living situations.
7. Of the 11,179 mothers who have legal fathers associated with their children, 28 percent are associated with more than one legal father. This results in a total of 14,343 couples. However, because about 7 percent of the fathers are associated with more than one mother in the sample, and each father is only included once, the final sample includes 13,339 fathers. Several strategies are employed when a father is associated with more than one mother. For example, the number of children is summed across mothers. The AFDC history of a randomly selected mother is considered.
8. There is some limited information on fathers from mothers, who were asked to provide basic information on the father of the focal child. Fathers in prison could not be interviewed; a recent national estimate is that fewer than 10 percent of all nonresident fathers are in prison (Sorensen and Oliver 2002) .
9. In 2002, median household incomes for Hispanics and blacks were substantially less than that of non-Hispanic whites: incomes for blacks were 62 percent of the income of whites, and incomes of Hispanics were 71 percent. Young householders have substantially less household income than those ages 45-54: incomes for householders ages 15-24 were 47 percent of those ages 45-54, and incomes for those ages 25-34 were 77 percent of those ages 45-54 (DeNavas-Walt, Cleveland, and Webster 2003) .
10. A more detailed discussion of earnings, as well as information on wages, job skills, and occupations, can be found in Cancian and Haveman (2001) .
11. This conclusion holds even if the sample is broadened to include the 3,256 fathers of welfare recipients who entered during this time period but were not in the base CSDE sample (those with extended delays in entering W-2). Mean earnings for this group are $6,900 in 1998 and $7,100 in 1999, slightly lower than the base sample.
12. Administrative data include all legal fathers. The target sample for the survey included the father of a randomly selected focal child. Thus, the survey underrepresents fathers of children in multiple-father families receiving W-2. To test the sensitivity to this difference in sample definitions, earnings in administrative data are recalculated only for fathers of the focal child. The figures are generally quite similar to those for all fathers. For example, in 1998, 37.0 percent of fathers of focal children had no earnings, compared with 38.3 percent of all fathers, and 4.6 percent of fathers in both samples had earnings over $30,000. Because several fathers did not answer all income questions, the total sample of fathers with family income information is 460 in 1998 and 504 in 1999.
13. The official poverty threshold varies with family size; in 1998, the poverty threshold for a family of one, two, or three was $8,050, $10,850, or $13,650, respectively. This work calculates the number of people in the family, including the father, his spouse or partner (if he has one), and any children living in the household. Another tested measure also counts any other adults in the father's household in the family size. With this measure, poverty rates are slightly higher (49 percent in 1998 vs. 43 percent; 38 percent in 1999 vs. 34 percent). However, the latter measure is less accurate. It includes other adults in the calculation of family size, but does not consider their incomes in the measure of family income.
14. For example, some orders assume fathers could be working full time and earning at least the minimum wage, even if they are currently unemployed.
15. In Wisconsin, some orders are expressed as a dollar amount, and some are expressed as a percentage of the nonresident parent's income (e.g., 17 percent of income). For the latter type of order, the dollar amount is estimated from administrative income data.
16. The sample includes only fathers of children in families participating in W-2. Nonresident fathers with higher income who pay support may be paying enough that their ex-partners would not be receiving W-2, and thus would not be in our sample.
17. The figures discussed here are based on a sample that includes fathers whose children have mothers in the experimental group of the CSDE (those mothers who receive all child support paid on their behalf) and fathers whose children have mothers in the control group (those who receive only a portion of the child support paid on their behalf). The CSDE experimental impact evaluation finds that fathers in the experimental group were more likely to pay support in both 1998 and 1999. There is also a significant difference in the amount paid in 1999. For more details, see Meyer and Cancian (2001, sec. I.4.1) . The experimental evaluation relies on administrative reports of the full administrative data sample, so the figures are not directly comparable. Although fathers in the experimental group paid more support, there are generally few significant differences in economic status post-child support. For example, there was no significant difference in the proportion of fathers reporting any hardship. However, fathers in the experimental group were somewhat less likely to report receiving assistance. The effect is statistically significant. Although fathers in the experimental group paid more support, there are generally few significant differences in economic status post-child support. For example, there was no significant difference in the proportion of fathers reporting any hardship. However, fathers in the experimental group were somewhat less likely to report receiving assistance. The effect is statistically significant.
18. It is possible that fathers would change their labor market behavior if they were actually ordered to pay the amount of child support we estimate. Because prior research has found little relationship between paying child support and labor supply (Freeman and Waldfogel 1998) , we ignore potential behavioral responses. Similarly, because prior research has also found small or inconsistent effects between receiving support and mothers' labor supply (e.g., Hu 1999), we also ignore these potential behavioral responses when we estimate the effect of child support on mothers' poverty rates.
19. A father of two children with the same mother would owe 25 percent of his income. A father of two children with different mothers would owe 17 percent of his income for the first child, and then 17 percent of the remaining income to the second child, for a total of 31 percent ( ). .17 ϩ .17[1.00 Ϫ .17] p .3111 20. Resident mothers may have greater access to other income supports than many nonresident fathers. One policy of particular interest is the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). If resident-mother families received the maximum estimated EITC, their poverty rate would fall from the pre-EITC rate of 76 percent to a post-EITC rate of 68 percent in 1998, and from a pre-EITC rate of 68 percent to 59 percent in 1999. The comparable figures for nonresident fathers (who may have higher family income due to the EITC if they or their new partners have resident children) suggest that the EITC has a more modest poverty reduction potential for these families: from 43 to 40 percent in 1998 and from 34 to 30 percent in 1999.
